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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS FOR SECURED
CREDITORS AFTER NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH UCC SECTION 9-504(3): THE
OKLAHOMA APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
When a debtor defaults on his obligation to a secured creditor, the
creditor looks to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") to
determine his rights and remedies.' Of the remedies available to the se-
cured creditor, repossession and resale of collateral is the most com-
monly used.2 The UCC outlines the procedure for disposition of the
collateral, 3 but does not explicitly state whether a secured party that fails
to comply with these requirements waives the right to a deficiency judg-
ment.' Consequently, a controversy has arisen which has led to different
judicial approaches.
Oklahoma case law has clearly eliminated an approach that com-
pletely bars a noncomplying secured creditor from obtaining a deficiency
1. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (1990).
2. JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-9 (2d ed. 1980). See also BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4.06 (2d ed. 1988).
3. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) provides in part:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by
way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and
at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the
method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collat-
eral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on
a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposi-
tion is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after
default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale.
4. In general, deficiency is that part of a secured obligation which remains after crediting the
original debt with net proceeds accruing from the sale of the security by the creditor. Thus, a defi-
ciency judgment is a judgment or decree for that part of a secured debt not realized from the sale of
the collateral. See Okmulgee Motor Sales Co. v. Prentice, 371 P.2d 723 (Okla. 1962).
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judgment.' The case law is not clear, however, concerning what the se-
cured creditor must do to obtain a deficiency judgment if the UCC re-
quirements have not been followed. The best judicial approach requires
the noncomplying secured creditor to overcome a presumption that the
proceeds of the sale equaled the value of the outstanding debt by proving
that the amount of the debt exceeded the fair market value of the collat-
eral at the time of the sale.
II. THE PROBLEM
How should the law balance the right of a creditor to recover the
full balance of an outstanding debt from a defaulting debtor with the
right of a debtor to receive the fair market value of his property, the
collateral, as a credit toward that debt? When a debtor defaults on an
obligation to a secured creditor, the UCC allows the creditor to take pos-
session of the collateral.6 The creditor may dispose of the collateral and
apply the proceeds first to the expenses of the sale and finally to offset the
indebtedness.7 Unless otherwise agreed between the debtor and the se-
cured creditor, the debtor remains liable for any deficiency that results
when the proceeds of the sale are less than the amount of the outstanding
debt.' UCC section 9-504(3) prescribes proceedings for the disposal of
collateral by the secured party and mandates that every aspect of the
proceedings be conducted in a "commercially reasonable"9 manner.10
This section also requires that the secured party give "reasonable no-
tice"11 to the debtor concerning the time and place of the sale. 2 When
the creditor fails to comply with the requirements of notice and commer-
cial reasonableness, UCC section 9-507(1) provides the debtor the right
to recover from the creditor any damages incurred. 3 One example of
5. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla. 1980).
6. U.C.C. § 9-503 provides in part: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default
the right to take possession of the collateral."
7. U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
8. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) provides in part: "[U]nless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any
deficiency." Although the Code does not define what "any deficiency" means, it is usually inter-
preted as the deduction of the collateral sales proceeds from the outstanding debt of the debtor.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 26-9.
9. For a discussion of what constitutes "commercial reasonableness," see generally C. David
Stinson, Secured Transactions: Commercial Reasonability of Secured Party's Sale of Collateral After
Default Under 9-504(3), 29 OKLA. L. REv. 486, 497-505 (1976).
10. U.C.C. § 9-504(3); supra note 3.
11. For a discussion of what constitutes "reasonable notice," see Nancy J. West, The Deficiency
Judgment in Illinois and the Notice Requirement of UCC 9-504(3): Are Illinois Courts on the Right
Track?, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 419, 426-29.
12. U.C.C. § 9-504(3); supra note 3.
13. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) provides in part:
[Vol. 27:27
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damage that a debtor might suffer is loss of the debtor's equity interest
when the collateral is sold for well under its market value. The debtor
could also face a greater deficiency on his debt to the creditor than would
have existed if a reasonable sale had taken place.
An interpretation problem developed because the Code does not
state whether a secured party's right to recover a deficiency is contingent
on its compliance with the requirements of notice and commercial rea-
sonableness.t 4 The judicial approaches to this dilemma range from com-
pletely barring a deficiency recovery by a noncomplying creditor to
allowing the deficiency judgment regardless of the creditor's noncompli-
ance with the Code."5 These judicial variations have generally fallen into
one of three distinct categories.1 6
III. THE THREE APPROACHES
A. The Absolute Bar Approach
The absolute bar rule 7 requires compliance with Code provisions as
a condition precedent to a creditor's recovery of a deficiency judgment.
If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose
security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a
right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the
provisions of this Part.
14. See Leasco Computer, Inc. v. Sheridan Indus., Inc., [1990] 6G Bender's U.C.C. Serv. (MB)
§ 9-504, No. 95, at A-124 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975). One of the Code's drafters, Grant Gilmore, admits
that the drafters did not consider the relationship between the debtor's liability for a deficiency and
the secured party's liability for noncompliance with the 9-504(3) requirements. II GRANT GIL-
MORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4 (1965).
15. See Leasco Computer, [1990] 6G Bender's U.C.C. Serv. (MB) § 9-504; WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 2, § 26-15.
16. See CLARK, supra note 2, 1 4.12(4); Arthur J. Rosner, A Creditor's Right to a Deficiency
Judgment Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Effect of Lack of Notice, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 56, 61 (1975); Howard Foss, The Noncomplying Secured Party's Right to a Deficiency, 21
UCC L.J. 226 (1989).
17. Some courts applying the absolute bar approach are: Arkansas (First State Bank of Morril-
ton v. Hallett, 722 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1987)); California (C.I.T. Corp. v. Anwright Corp., 237 Cal.
Rptr. 108 (Ct. App. 1987)); Connecticut (Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc., 427
A.2d 872 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980) (dicta)); Delaware (Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d
773 (Del. 1980)); District of Columbia (Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1979));
Iowa (Rock Rapids State Bank v. Gray, 366 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1985)); Kentucky (Bank Josephine
v. Conn, 599 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)); Maine (Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d
329 (Me. 1973)); Maryland (First Nat'l Bank of Md. v. DiDomenico, 487 A.2d 646 (Md. 1985));
Michigan (Honor State Bank v. Timber Wolf Const. Co., 391 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986));
Missouri (Smith v. Mark Twain Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1986)); Montana (Westmont
Tractor Co. v. Continental I, Inc., 731 P.2d 327 (Mont. 1986)); Nebraska (Deutsche Credit Corp. v.
Hi-Bo Farms, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 693 (Neb. 1987)); New York (Central Budget Corp. v. Garrett, 368
N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 1975)); Ohio (Liberty Nat'l Bank of Fremont v. Greiner, 405 N.E.2d 317
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978)); Texas (Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982));
Utah (Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 28 (Utah 1982)); Vermont (In re Wayne
Ford-Chrysler, Inc., 38 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984)); Washington (Service Chevrolet, Inc. v.
3
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The creditor is barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment in the event
he fails to give the debtor proper notice of the sale of collateral or to
conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner.1 By far, the true
application of the absolute bar is the harshest approach.
Pre-Code law generally barred a deficiency judgment in similar situ-
ations of creditor misbehavior. 9 The Uniform Conditional Sales Act
("U.C.S.A") 2° had sections that closely paralleled sections 9-504(2) and
9-507(1) of the Code.21 Courts, with few exceptions, demanded literal
compliance with the complicated U.C.S.A. provisions as a condition pre-
cedent to the seller's recovery of any deficiency.22 Professor Gilmore,
one of the UCC drafters, argues that under the minimal formal require-
ments of Article 9, relative to the requirements under U.C.S.A., it is
quite reasonable that compliance be a condition precedent to a deficiency
recovery. Furthermore, Professor Gilmore contends that if the Code
drafters had proposed to overthrow the firmly established and generally
accepted construction of the older statute, such intent would surely have
been manifested in clear and unambiguous language.2 a
Some courts, considering both the ease with which a creditor can
comply with the UCC rules and the severe detriment that a debtor suffers
in the case of noncompliance, have decided that the absolute bar is an
appropriate debtor remedy. Additionally, courts consider the absolute
bar approach as a strong deterrent to creditor noncompliance. 24 A fail-
ure to give notice can never be considered harmless, absolute bar propo-
nents contend, because in all likelihood it will deny the debtor his right of
redemption under section 9-506 and severely disadvantage the debtor de-
fending against a deficiency action.25 Hence, the strongest possible in-
centives for secured party compliance must be in place to guarantee the
debtor an opportunity to protect his interests.26
On the other hand, detractors of the absolute bar rule respond that
Sparks, 660 P.2d 760 (Wash. 1983) (en bane)); Wyoming (Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168
(Wyo. 1978)).
18. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Emerald, 270 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703-04 (Ct. App. 1990).
19. II GILMORE, supra note 14, § 44.9.4.
20. The UNIF. CONDrrIONAL SALES AcT, 2 U.L.A. (1922) was a uniform act promulgated by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1918. It was adopted by
several states, but was later integrated into the UCC and is no longer in use.
21. II GILMORE, supra note 14, § 44.9.4.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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courts have no right to bar the deficiency judgment expressly provided
for in section 9-504(2) and doing so is an unfair penalty.27 The absolute
bar is viewed as harsh and punitive since it is not based on the debtor's
actual loss or damages.2" These opponents of the absolute bar approach
argue that no sound policy requires the injection of such a drastic puni-
tive element into a commercial context.29
B. The Rebuttable Presumption Approach
If a secured party does not meet the requirements of the Code, the
rebuttable presumption rule30 allows the court to presume that the repos-
sessed collateral had a fair market value equal to the outstanding debt,
and therefore the debtor owes no deficiency. The burden shifts to the
creditor to overcome the presumption and prove that a deficiency exists.
To meet this burden, a creditor must prove the fair market value of the
collateral at the time of sale and show that the amount of the debt ex-
ceeded that value.3"
By requiring the creditor to establish the fair market value of the
collateral, independent of the amount realized at the sale, not only is the
27. Associates Capital Servs. Corp. v. Riccardi, 408 A.2d 930, 933 (R.I. 1979).
28. State Bank of Towner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 767 (N.D. 1981).
29. Valley Mining Corp. v. Metro Bank, 383 So. 2d 158, 164-65 (Ala. 1980); Hall v. Owen
County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 209
N.W.2d 341, 344 (Neb. 1973).
30. Some courts applying the rebuttable presumption approach are: Alaska (United Bank
Alaska v. Dischner, 685 P.2d 90 (Alaska 1984)); Colorado (1st Charter Lease Co. v. McAl, Inc., 679
P.2d 114 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)); Connecticut (Tennant Co. v. Martin's Landscaping, Inc., 515 A.2d
665 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986)); Florida (Weiner v. American Petrofina Mktg. Inc., 482 So. 2d 1362
(Fla. 1986)); Georgia (Emmons v. Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. 1987)); Hawaii (Liberty Bank v.
Honolulu Providoring Inc., 650 P.2d 576 (Haw. 1982)); Idaho (Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christen-
sen, 691 P.2d 787 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)); Illinois (First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Joannides, 469 N.E.2d 180 (111. 1984)); Indiana (Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977)); Kansas (Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 678 P.2d 1115 (Kan. 1984)); Min-
nesota (Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983)); Mississippi
(United States v. Bryant, 628 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Miss. 1986)); Nevada (U C Leasing, Inc. v.
Laughlin, 606 P.2d 167 (Nev. 1980)); New Jersey (Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Miller Mining Co.,
817 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1987)); New Mexico (Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods.,
Inc., 535 P.2d 1077 (N.M. 1975)); New York (General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante Bros. & Sons,
433 N.Y.S.2d 574 (App. Div. 1980)); North Carolina (Church v. Mickler, 287 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1982)); North Dakota (Lindberg v. Williston Indus. Supply Corp., 411 N.W.2d 368 (N.D.
1987)); Oregon (FDIC v. Tempest Fugat, 707 P.2d 81 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)); Pennsylvania (Savoy v.
Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 468 A.2d 465 (Pa. 1983)); Rhode Island (Associates Capital
Servs. Corp. v. Riccardi, 408 A.2d 930 (R.I. 1979)); Tennessee (Investors Acceptance Co. of Living-
ston v. James Talcott, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969)); Washington (Rotta v. Early
Indus. Corp., 733 P.2d 576 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)); Wisconsin (Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 405
N.W.2d 354 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
31. Smith v. Paige, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1000, 1006 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1990).
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true deficiency determined, but any damages of the debtor are also estab-
lished. If the fair market value turns out to be more than the amount
realized by selling the collateral, the difference represents the debtor's
damages. The debtor would recover these damages through the reduc-
tion of the amount of the deficiency. The creditor would only be entitled
to the difference between the newly established fair market value and the
debt, and would forfeit the amount of the debtor's damages, or the differ-
ence between the market value and the amount realized at the sale.
The court that formulated the rebuttable presumption rule empha-
sized that simple considerations of fair play require that the burden of
proof as to the debtor's damages be shifted to the misbehaving creditor.
After all, the creditor's actions made it difficult for the debtor to prove
the extent of the loss with reasonable certainty.3 2 Advocates of this ap-
proach contend that the burden shifting rule adequately protects the
debtor's right to notice without risking a harsh forfeiture by the creditor
in cases where the debtor suffered no actual damage.33
When the creditor fails to give the debtor notice or to hold a com-
mercially reasonable sale, the actual loss to the debtor could range from
an amount greater than the deficiency to no loss at all. In a case of nomi-
nal damages, allowing the absolute bar creates a windfall for the debtor
and another strong argument for the rebuttable presumption approach
over the absolute bar approach.34
Critics of the rebuttable presumption approach argue that when the
debtor is prevented from attending the sale by a failure of notice, being
expected to refute the evidence of the secured party is unfair because the
creditor has all the relevant information concerning the sale and the col-
lateral.35 Moreover, the rebuttable presumption is a "legal fiction" not
easily implied from UCC provisions.36 Rebutting the presumption may
allow a creditor to deny a debtor the express protections of notice and
commercial reasonableness provided under section 9-504(3) and his re-
demption rights under section 9-506.37 Opponents also argue that shift-
ing the burden to the creditor is unfair when the debtor's default created
32. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. 1966).
33. Smith, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1006.
34. Emmons v. Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908, 911 (Ga. 1987); First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Joannides, 469 N.E.2d 180, 182-83 (Il1. 1984).
35. State Natl Bank of Evanston v. Northwest Dodge, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1982).
36. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 17 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1971).
37. Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 772 (rex. 1982).
[VCol. 27:27
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the original problem. 8
C. The Set-off Approach
The set-off approach 9 does not require a secured creditor to comply
with Code requirements to obtain a deficiency judgment. Instead, the
debtor must prove that he suffered a loss due to noncompliance by the
creditor, which may then be used as a set-off against the amount of the
deficiency.' The set-off rule is based on the premise that section 9-
507(1) provides the debtor's exclusive remedy for damages incurred be-
cause of a creditor's noncompliance with the prescriptions of the UCC.
Under the set-off approach the debtor has the burden of proving the ex-
tent of his damages."a This approach is used by fewer courts than the
other two approaches. 42
Proponents of the set-off theory correctly point out that section 9-
504(2) expressly entitles a secured party to a deficiency and does not con-
dition it on compliance with other Code sections.43 Advocates state that
section 9-507(1) is a debtor's sole remedy because it is the only specific
UCC provision regarding damages caused by creditor misbehavior.'
Courts have ruled that not only is the relief under section 9-507(1) a
debtor's exclusive remedy, but it arguably affords the debtor adequate
compensatory relief in accordance with the Code.45
Critics of the set-off rule argue that by allocating the burden of proof
to the debtor, the rule penalizes the debtor for the creditor's misconduct.
Additionally, if the Code provisions can effectively be ignored, there is
minimal incentive to the secured party to comply. 6 Critics argue that
the burden is too great since the debtor must prove both noncompliance
on the part of the secured party and also that the noncompliance resulted
38. Note, Remedies for Failure to Notify Debtor of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral Under
the UCC, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 221, 232 (1972).
39. Some jurisdictions adopting the set-off approach are: Alabama (First Ala. Bank of Mont-
gomery v. Parsons, 426 So. 2d 416 (Ala. 1983)); Arizona (Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Goubeaux, 664 P.2d
183 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc)); New York (Stanchi v. Kemp, 370 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1975));
Washington (Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 496 P.2d 966 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972)).
40. IA PETER F. COOGAN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER U.C.C. § 8.06[2] (1984).
41. See generally Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 496 P.2d 966 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
42. 1A COOGAN, supra note 40.
43. Alan Aronowitz, Secured Creditor's Right to a Deficiency Judgment After Misbehavior
Under U.CC § 9-504(3): Which Judicial Approach Should Texas Adopt?, 21 Hous. L. REv. 359,
374-75 n.91 (1984).
44. William E. Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 UCC L.J. 244, 257 (1970).
45. Jones v. Morgan, 228 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
46. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d 993, 996 (Idaho 1980).
1991]
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in a specific amount of loss.4 7
This approach also has inherent proof problems. If the secured
party fails to give notice, the debtor might not have the opportunity to
attend the sale. When that happens, pertinent information known by the
creditor, such as the number of bidders and industry customs, will be
missed by the debtor. Therefore, the debtor will have problems overcom-
ing his burden, both in proving the value of the collateral for purposes of
quantifying the deficiency and in determining if the circumstances of the
sale were commercially reasonable.48
D. Variations on the Three Approaches
Authors commenting on this subject have promoted several varia-
tions of the three primary approaches as potential improvements in the
law of deficiency judgments. One author suggests drawing a line between
consumer and commercial transactions because the unsophisticated
consumer cannot be expected to understand the intricacies of what
constitutes a commercially reasonable sale.49 Hence, creditor noncom-
pliance should be deterred with the absolute bar approach to protect the
interests of these unwary consumers." A commercial entity, on the
other hand, is in a better position to understand the requirements of a
commercially reasonable sale of property and to fend for itself. In those
instances the rebuttable presumption approach would suffice.5 This ap-
proach involves, however, a double standard, which is generally disfa-
vored in the law. Moreover, the basic premise may be defective, given
the great number of small business commercial transactions and the rela-
tive savvy of some consumers.
Another suggestion distinguishes secured party and debtor ac-
tions.52 The underlying theory is that the party who asserts the affirma-
tive of an issue should have the burden of proving the issue.53 Thus, a
creditor seeking a deficiency judgment must first prove the commercial
reasonableness of the sale as required in the rebuttable presumption ap-
proach. A debtor seeking damages under section 9-507(1) must prove
47. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons, 426 So. 2d 416, 421 (Ala. 1983).
48. See generally Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982); Honor
State Bank v. Timber Wolf Constr. Co., 391 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
49. CLARK, supra note 2, 4.12(4).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Michael P. Donaldson, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral Under Arti-
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that the sale was not commercially reasonable as required in the set-off
approach.14 This was the logic of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in First
National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Holston."5
A third argument advocates flexibility and judicial discretion to use
the rule that best fits the specific situation.-6 For example, in a case of
failure of notice, the absolute bar rule should be applied to protect the
debtor who had no opportunity to protect his own interests. But, in a
case of a commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral, the rebut-
table presumption rule is more appropriate to force the creditor to prove
compliance with the Code." However, this method would deny parties
to secured transactions the predictability required in the commercial
business environment.
IV. THE OKLAHOMA PosrrioN
Before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had a chance to consider
the issue, it arose in Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., a
federal case applying Oklahoma law. That court ruled that under the
law in Oklahoma, a creditor was not entitled to a deficiency judgment
unless the sale of the collateral was commercially reasonable. 9 Since
this was a relatively unexplored area of Oklahoma law, no case authority
was cited for this conclusion. Rather, the court referred to a treatise on
the UCC that supported the alisolute bar rule.6'
Five years later in First National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Hol-
ston,61 the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled: "Before the secured creditor
may recover a deficiency judgment, the sale must have been made in a
commercially reasonable manner with proper notice, otherwise the
debtor may recover damages for commercially unreasonable sale."62 The
court missed its opportunity to clear up the Oklahoma position. Rather
than clearly differentiating between an absolute bar of the deficiency
judgment and a recovery for damages by the debtor under section 9-
507(1), this holding blended the two together in an attempt to cover all
54. Id.
55. 559 P.2d 440, 444 (Okla. 1976).
56. Foss, supra note 16.
57. Id.
58. 337 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
59. Id. at 663.
60. Id. ("The creditor is not entitled to a deficiency judgment unless the sale of the collateral
was conducted in a manner which was commercially reasonable." (quoting 4 RONALD A. ANDER-
SON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504:28 (2d ed. 1971))).
61. 559 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1976).
62. Id. at 443.
1991]
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the bases. Did the court mean to say that a deficiency judgment is con-
tingent upon the secured party following the rules or that a deficiency
judgment is allowed no matter what, subject only to a set-off for actual
damages of the debtor?
What First National Bank is quite clear on, however, is that the bur-
den of proving whether the sale of collateral was commercially reason-
able is on the party raising the question.6 3 Where the secured party seeks
a deficiency judgment he would carry the burden; but where the debtor
pursues the damage remedy allowed under section 9-507(1), the burden
shifts to the debtor."4 That same year in Davidson v. First Bank & Trust
Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court included a sentence which gave the
impression that the absolute bar rule was applicable: "In other words the
mortgagee is not entitled to a deficiency judgment."65 The sentence was
never to have been included in the final draft and, indeed, the case was
re-published with the sentence deleted.66
The definitive Oklahoma statement on this issue evolved in Benefi-
cial Finance Co. v. Young.67 This 1980 case expressly overruled the
above mentioned sentence from Davidson, although the court denied it
was ever the law of Oklahoma. 68 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma rea-
soned that the absolute bar approach was punitive in nature and against
the intent of the Code. 6 9 The court pointed out that the debtor's protec-
tion against noncompliance was provided by the Code drafters in section
9-507(1) and expressed the opinion that this provided adequate protec-
tion for the debtor.7' They ruled that to withhold a creditor's right to a
deficiency judgment would not only protect the debtor but would also
penalize the creditor.71 Because the sale of the collateral was necessi-
tated by the default of the debtor in the first place, the court decided that
punishing the creditor for noncompliance in the absence of malice, fraud,
or oppression would be unjustified. 2
63. Id. at 444.
64. Id.
65. 559 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1976), partially overruled by Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612
P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1980).
66. Davidson v. First Bank & Trust Co., 609 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Okla. 1977), modifying 559 P.2d
1228 (Okla. 1976).
67. 612 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1980).
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Furthermore, the court cited section 1-106 as supportive of its posi-
tion that exemplary damages are allowed only in those instances ex-
pressly provided in the Code or by other rules of law and that no such
damages were provided for noncompliance with section 9-504(3)."
Therefore, since the effect of the absolute bar rule is similar to an award
of exemplary damages, it is contrary to express UCC provisions.
V. A MIDDLE GROUND
Secured parties need the ability to enforce their security agreements
against the collateral of their defaulting debtors with a minimum of hard-
ship and red tape. Without this ability, credit for both consumers and
businesses would become more restricted. At the same time, the debtor
must be protected from abuse by overreaching or uncaring creditors who
must act responsibly concerning the disposition of the debtor's property.
Presumably the intent of the Code was to further both these goals.7 4
The rebuttable presumption approach provides a middle ground
from which both of these goals can be addressed." Unlike the absolute
bar approach, the rebuttable presumption approach does not risk harshly
punishing a creditor for a mere technicality that causes no actual damage
to the debtor. On the other hand, the rebuttable presumption approach
avoids placing a seemingly insurmountable burden of proof upon the
debtor as in the set-off approach.76
A. Barring the Absolute Bar Rule
One of the principle arguments for absolutely barring a creditor's
deficiency judgment when that creditor has failed to give reasonable no-
tice or dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, as
required by the Code, is the precedent set by pre-Code law.77 Courts,
with few exceptions, required a strict adherence to the provisions of the
U.C.S.A. which preceded the UCC.78 The U.C.S.A. treated the question
of the debtor's liability for a deficiency and the creditor's liability for any
failure to comply with Code requirements in sections that were basically
73. Id.
74. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Holston, 559 P.2d 440, 443 (Okla. 1976).
75. Smith v. Paige, I1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1000, 1006 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1990).
76. Aronowitz, supra note 43, at 395.
77. Note, The Right to an Article 9 Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice of Resale, 7 VAL.
U. L. REV. 465, 471 (1973).
78. II GILMORE, supra note 14, § 44.9.4.
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comparable to UCC sections 9-504(3) and 9-507(1). 79 Therefore, the ar-
gument goes, the UCC did not alter this link between compliance and the
right to a deficiency judgment.80
Actually, the UCC was enacted because the stringent system of reg-
ulation under the U.C.S.A. had failed." The U.C.S.A. had established
burdensome requirements which had little practical benefit. 2 As indi-
cated by the official comment, the UCC was designed to supercede prior
legislation such as the U.C.S.A.83 The aim of Article 9 was to provide "a
simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of pres-
ent-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and
with greater certainty."8 4 Rather than continue the requirement of strin-
gent enforcement, the UCC has relaxed these standards in an attempt to
add flexibility for the creditor in obtaining the highest realization from
the collateral.8" The only restriction placed on the disposition is that it
be commercially reasonable. s6
Furthermore, the U.C.S.A. allowed public sales and auctions, re-
quiring creditors to give notice to both the debtor and the public.8 7 A
failure to give notice under these rules would defeat the very policy of the
sale since an unnotified public could certainly not attend the sale. Under
the U.C.S.A. the harshness of the penalty to the creditor matched the
harshness of the consequences of his actions. The notice requirement
under the UCC has been relaxed to require "reasonable" notice rather
than the exacting requirements of the U.C.S.A. 8 Since private sales are
encouraged, 9 and the only notice required to be given the debtor is no-
tice of the time after which the private sale will take place,90 a lack of
notice assumes a less harsh consequence under the UCC than it did
under the U.C.S.A.
A final difference between the Code and the U.C.S.A. pertains to the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Grant Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Part V-Default, 7 CON. ON
PERs. FIN. L.Q. 4, 7 (1952).
82. Id.
83. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.
84. Id.
85. U.C.C. § 9-504 cmt 1.
86. Id.
87. UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 19, 2 U.L.A. 30 (1922).
88. U.C.C. § 9-504 cmt. 5.
89. Id. cmt. 1.
90. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
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purpose of denying a deficiency judgment. Under the U.C.S.A. the de-
nial of the deficiency judgment was intended to operate as a deterrent
and therefore was penal in nature.91 The Code, on the other hand, spe-
cifically rejects the notion of special or penal damages.92 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in deciding not to bar a secured party's right to a defi-
ciency judgment in an instance of noncompliance with the Code, agreed
that such a forfeiture would go beyond compensatory damages and
therefore was outside the intent of the Code.93
Rather than look to pre-Code law, which is not controlling, an anal-
ogy to a Code provision outside of Article 9 proves enlightening. Article
2, which refers to sales, provides that when a buyer rejects acceptance of
goods, the seller may resell the goods and recover damages.94 The notice
provision in section 2-706 is similar to section 9-504 and substantiates the
idea that failure to comply with the Code should not result in a loss of a
right to a deficiency judgment.95 Unlike section 9-504, section 2-706
makes compliance with its requirements an express condition precedent
to the seller's right to recover the difference between the sale price and
the contract price.96 Although the seller who fails to comply with the
requirements of section 2-706 loses his right to use the sale price as an
absolute measure of damages, he may still recover damages based on the
market value of the goods.9 7 This comparison of Code sections shows
that the drafters intended that a secured party (or a seller) not lose all
rights in the collateral for a failure to comply with the Code. Instead, the
burden of proving true market value to establish damages becomes the
responsibility of the seller.
Another aspect of the absolute bar approach to be considered is the
"all or nothing" situation arising from the application of the rule. Under
this rule, a court is faced with denying a deficiency altogether or allowing
a deficiency based on the sale price of the collateral. It is easy to imagine
a variety of judicial interpretations of the standard, "commercially rea-
sonable." A commercially unreasonable sale of collateral does not neces-
sarily mean that the collateral was sold for less than its fair market value.
A sale might fall outside the parameters of a jurisdiction's definition of
91. Note, supra note 77, at 474.
92. U.C.C. § 1-106 which provides in part: "[N]either consequential or special nor penal dam-
ages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law."
93. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla. 1980).
94. U.C.C. § 2-706(1).
95. Note, supra note 77, at 478.
96. U.C.C. § 2-706(1).
97. Id. cmt. 2.
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commercially reasonable and yet produce the full value of the debtor's
property from the sale. In such a case, the debtor suffers no actual loss
and yet the court is faced with denying the creditor a deficiency for
which the debtor is truly liable. A court faced with this unfair result of
the absolute bar rule might stretch the definition of "commercially rea-
sonable" to avoid the harsh result.
B. Rebuttable Presumption or Set-Off?
Although it is clear that Oklahoma has ruled out the absolute bar of
a deficiency judgment when the creditor has failed to meet the require-
ments of the Code,9 8 it is unclear whether there is a presumption that the
value of collateral equals the outstanding debt at the time of sale. The
court in First National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid established that a credi-
tor seeking a deficiency judgment has the burden of proving Code com-
pliance.9 9 If the secured party fails to prove the commercial
reasonableness of the sale or sufficient notice to the debtor, is the burden
on him to prove that the value of the collateral was less than the debt and
that there is therefore a deficiency (the rebuttable presumption ap-
proach)? Or, will the burden lie with the debtor to prove damages under
section 9-507(1) to be set-off against any deficiency (the set-off rule)? By
not expressly ruling on which party has the burden of proof as to the
value of the collateral when a creditor seeks a deficiency judgment, the
Beneficial court has left Oklahoma with an ambiguous position.
Several writers addressing this issue, when listing the jurisdictions
that have adopted the various approaches, list Beneficial, and therefore
Oklahoma, under the set-off approach. 1" The Beneficial court did refer
to section 9-507(1) as adequate protection for the debtor.10 The court
pointed out that if the creditor's noncompliance results in damage to the
debtor, the debtor has a right to recover those damages.10 2 Admittedly,
this language sounds similar to that of the proponents of the set-off ap-
proach.10 3 Subsequent cases have discussed a creditor being able to re-
cover a deficiency judgment even after failing to comply with the Code
requirements, subject to liability for any damages caused by the
98. Beneficial, 612 P.2d at 1359.
99. First Nat' Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 559 P.2d at 444.
100. Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060, 1069 (Alaska 1981) (Burke, J., dissenting); 1A COOGAN,
supra note 40; Donaldson, supra note 52; Foss, supra note 16.
101. Beneficial, 612 P.2d at 1359.
102. Id.
103. See generally Jones v. Morgan, 228 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
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Courts interpreting Oklahoma law have had trouble determining
where to place the burden of proving the value of the collateral at the
time of sale. In 1989, a Federal Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma ruled that this burden was on the secured party,10 ' but
interestingly cited a 1971 federal case that applied Arkansas law,"
rather than an Oklahoma case.
The state of the law on this issue in Oklahoma must be clarified. If
the intent of the court in Beneficial was to adopt the set-off approach and
place the burden of proving damages squarely on the debtor, the law
should be changed. The set-off approach not only penalizes the debtor
for the misbehavior of the creditor, but also makes the requirements of
notice and commercial reasonableness moot." 7 Even if the creditor fails
to prove that he complied with the Code requirements, the debtor would
get no relief unless he could prove specific damages. 10 8 Proving damages
would require that the debtor establish the value of collateral that, in
most cases, had already been disposed of without appraisal. In cases
where the creditor failed to give notice, the debtor would not even have
the benefit of having witnessed the sale to help him determine the reason-
ableness of the value received.10
9
The rebuttable presumption approach goes to the heart of the issue.
Rather than focusing on whether the sale was commercially reasonable,
it focuses on the purpose for that requirement, which is to assure that the
fair market value of the collateral or credit for that amount is received by
the debtor. Placing the burden of proving the market value of the collat-
eral at the time of the disposition on the secured party is reasonable and
protects the debtor's interest in the collateral. The creditor should not be
able to use the amount received for the collateral as evidence of its
value.110 The creditor, having possession of the collateral, is in the best
position to ascertain its true value.11' This responsibility should not rep-
resent a great burden on the creditor, assuming that his motivation is to
receive the maximum proceeds from the collateral. This motive should
104. Equico Lessors, Inc. v. Wetsel, 576 F. Supp. 13, 18 (W.D. Okla. 1983); First State Bank of
Oilton v. Perryman, 746 P.2d 706 (Okla. App. 1987).
105. In re Reed, 102 B.R. 243, 246 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989).
106. Leasing Assoc. v. Slaughter & Son, 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971).
107. See generally Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d 993 (Idaho 1980).
108. See generally First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons, 426 So. 2d 416 (Ala. 1982).
109. See Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340, 345 (D.C. 1979).
110. Smith v. Paige, I 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1000, 1006 (Va. Cir. Ct 1990).
111. In re Nardone, 70 B.R. 1010, 1016 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
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exist since the creditor has no assurance that he will be able to collect any
deficiency from the defaulting debtor. The first step in obtaining the
maximum value from the sale of an item is to establish its worth. By
assuring that the maximum proceeds are received for the collateral, the
creditor is protecting not only the debtor's interests but his own as well.
Consider the following example. A lender loans a borrower eight
thousand dollars and takes a security interest in the debtor's car. The
debtor eventually goes into default and the creditor repossesses the car
and sells it for five thousand dollars. When the creditor sues for the three
thousand dollar deficiency, assuming he cannot prove compliance, the
burden falls on him to prove the fair market value. Assume that the
evidence shows the value at the time of sale to have been six thousand
dollars. The debtor is liable for the true deficiency of two thousand dol-
lars. The creditor suffers the actual cost of his apparently commercially
unreasonable sale, the one thousand dollar difference between the sales
price and the fair market value. This method allows the creditor to re-
cover the full amount of the debt owed to him, without the risk of a
severe penalty, subject only to obtaining the full value for the collateral
of which he is in charge. It ensures that the debtor will only be liable for
the true deficiency and not one inflated by a below market sale of his
property and that the creditor will be motivated to hold a commercially
reasonable sale in the first place.
Either through specific legislation or a ruling by the Supreme Court,
Oklahoma should lay to rest any question of which party has the burden
of proof. If the creditor failed to prove compliance with the Code, a
rebuttable presumption that the proceeds of the sale equaled the value of
the outstanding debt would arise.112 The burden of overcoming this pre-
sumption would fall on the creditor, thereby protecting the interests of
the debtor as the Code intended. It should be made clear that a secured
creditor may recover a deficiency judgment from the debtor if he proves
either (1) that reasonable notice of the sale was provided to the debtor
and the sale was performed in a commercially reasonable manner, or (2)
that the amount of the debt exceeded the fair market value of the collat-
eral at the time of the sale by the amount of the deficiency sought. 113
112. Mack, 606 P.2d at 996.
113. Smith, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1006.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Many jurisdictions have faced or will face the difficult task of deter-
mining a legal question which was apparently overlooked by the Code
drafters.' 14 Having considered the relative merits of the three judicial
approaches, the rebuttable presumption approach seems to most closely
conform with the goals and policies of the Code. In light of this, and due
to the fact that the law is presently unclear, Oklahoma should explicitly
adopt the rebuttable presumption approach.
Mick Leslie
114. II GILMORE, supra note 14, § 44.9.4.
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